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Abstract—Malware detection have used machine learning to
detect malware in programs. These applications take in raw
or processed binary data to neural network models to classify
as benign or malicious files. Even though this approach has
proven effective against dynamic changes, such as encrypting,
obfuscating and packing techniques, it is vulnerable to specific
evasion attacks where that small changes in the input data
cause misclassification at test time. This paper proposes a new
approach: MDEA, an Adversarial Malware Detection model uses
evolutionary optimization to create attack samples to make the
network robust against evasion attacks. By retraining the model
with the evolved malware samples, its performance improves a
significant margin.
Index Terms—Evolutionary Learning, Malware Detection, Ad-
versarial Learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The high proliferation of and dependence on computing
resources in daily life has greatly increased the potential of
malware to harm consumers[1]. It is estimated that almost one
in four computers operating in the U.S. were already infected
by malware in 2008 [2] and according to Kaspersky Lab, up
to one billion dollars was stolen from financial institutions
worldwide due to malware attacks in 2015 [3]. More recently,
the notorious and widespread NotPetya ransomware attack
is estimated to have caused $10 billion dollars in damages
worldwide. Even worse, as reported by McAfee Labs, the
diversity of malware is still evolving in expanding areas such
that in Q1 2018, on average, five new malware samples were
generated per second [4]. As a specific example, total coin
miner malware rose by 629% in Q1 to more than 2.9 million
samples in 2018 [4].
As a result of the magnitude of the threat posed by malware,
a great deal of research has been done on malware identifi-
cation. At the moment there are two widely used approaches:
dynamic analysis, which obtains features by monitoring pro-
gram executions, and static analysis, which analyzes features
of binary programs without running them. Intuitively, the
dynamic analysis is the first choice, since it can provide more
accurate program behavior data. However, there are many
issues in dynamic analysis in practice. It requires a specially
constructed running environment such as a customized Virtual
Machine (VM), which is computationally very costly when
numerous samples are tested. Furthermore, in order to bypass
this defense, some malware alter the behaviors when they are
detected [5], [6]. The analysis environment can also get false
positive data from other software that are running in the same
environment.
On the other hand, the static analysis methods also have
disadvantages. The signature-based method such as API calls
and N-grams provides the basis for most commercial an-
tivirus products [7], [8]. While it is widely used, its ability
to combat various encryption, polymorphism and obfusca-
tion methods used by malware attackers is limited. Machine
learning based malware classification technologies have been
applied to malware detection [9], [10]. which rely heavily
on relevant domain knowledge to provide applicable features.
This approach cannot adapt to fast changing malware patterns
nor polymorphism. In recent years, researchers have begun
exploring a new frontier in data mining and machine learning
known as deep learning. Deep learning techniques are now
being leveraged in malware detection and classification tasks
[11], [12], [13], [14]. Sparse Autoencocder (SAE), Convolu-
tional Neural Network (CNN), and Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN) models are all used to devise malware detection archi-
tectures. Although research thus far has provided promising
results, there are still many open challenges and opportunities.
First of all, due to the quick increase in the amount of novel
malware, malicious techniques and patterns are changing and
evolving rapidly. As a result, handling novel malware is one
of the most pressing issues. In addition, in contrast to the
natural language processing or computer vision tasks that are
usually explored in deep learning tasks, malware byte files
and assembly instructions have less understandable patterns.
Therefore data prepossessing techniques are much more im-
portant. Furthermore, the adversarial attacks against neural
networks, which only manipulate small portion of the input
data to cause misclassification, has been proven to be a big
vulnerability. Even though these types of adversarial attacks
are less common on malware detection models because of the
complexity and fragility of binary executables, it is possible to
evade deep neural network for malware binary detection. For
example, Kolosnjaji et al. [15] trained a gradient-based model
to append bytes to the overlay section of malware samples.
Even though the model successfully evaded the deep neural
network, both the model and the modification method are
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rather simple and cannot cover the complicated modifications
real malware writers do such as modifying various sections
based on domain knowledge.
In order to explore the data space more thoroughly, an
action space is defined. It consists of 10 different modification
methods of binary programs. An evolutionary optimization is
used to search the best action sequence of a specific malware.
This paper proposes MDEA, an Adversarial Malware De-
tection model that combines a deep neural network with
an evolutionary optimization at its training. MDEA consists
of a convolutional neural network that classifies raw byte
data from malware binaries, and an evolutionary optimization
that modifies the malware that are detected. In contrast to
simply appending bytes to the end of each file, an action
space is defined for the evolutionary optimization to pick
from and choose best action sequences for each malware
sample. With the evolutionary learning, the probability that
the generated input sample is classified as benign can be
maximally increased. The new samples will then be fed into
the detection network for retraining. The above steps represent
a form of adversarial training [16].
The experiments were performed on 7371 Windows
Portable Executable (PE) malware samples and 6917 be-
nign PE samples. The results showed that MDEA not only
drastically decreased the detection model accuracy, but also
increased the overall detection performance from 90% to 93%
after the retraining process. This result shows that adversarial
evolutionary training can improve both robustness and perfor-
mance of the malware detection network.
The rest of the paper structures as follows. Section 2
presents related work. Section 3 describes an overview of
MDEA and the details of each component. Section 4 describes
the experimental setup and discusses the results. Section 5
provides suggestions for further research on this topic and
Section 6 draws conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
Malware detection and classification has been studied prob-
lem for many years. Notably, in 2015, the open Kaggle
Contest: Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge (BIG
2015)[17] created a lot of interest in malware classification.
The champion of this contest used machine learning with
sophisticated static pattern analysis. Following that trend the
goal of this paper is to leverage deep learning models without
sophisticated feature engineering. This section briefly intro-
duces related work in signature-based, learning-based [14], ad-
versarial based [18] approaches, and evolutionary techniques.
A. Signature-based Malware Detection
Signature-based and behavior-based methods are widely
used in the anti-malware industry and are often used to iden-
tify “known” malware.[19] When an anti-malware solution
provider identifies an object as malicious, its signature is
added to a database of known malware. These repositories may
contain hundreds of millions of signatures that identify mali-
cious objects. One of the major advantages of such signature-
based malware detection is that it is thorough, it follows all
conceivable execution ways of a given document [20]. Because
it is simple to build such a system, signature-based malware
detection has been the primary identification technique used
by malware products. It remains the base approach used by the
latest firewalls, email and network gateways. Therefore, much
research has been done in this field. Santos et al.[21] created
an opcode sequence-based malware detection system. Preda et
al.[22] proposed a semantics-based framework for reasoning
about malware detector. Fraley and Figueroa[23] presented
a unique approach leveraging topological examination using
signature-based techniques. They also used data mining tech-
niques in order to uncover and spotlight the properties of
malicious files. Despite the widespread adoption of signature-
based malware detection within the information security in-
dustry, malware authors can easily evade this signature-based
method through techniques such as encryption, polymorphism,
and obfuscation. Signature-based analysis is, therefore, poorly
equipped to handle the current state of malware generation.
B. Learning-based Malware Classification
Because of the weaknesses of signature-based malware
detection, machine learning is a popular approach to signa-
tureless malware detection. Many different malware detection
approaches using machine learning technology have been pro-
posed in recent years. These approaches include static analysis,
which learns the statistical characteristics of malware (e.g.
API calls, N-grams), and dynamic behavior analysis, which
analyzes the behavior of a system against a baseline in order
to determine anomalous (and possibly malicious) behavior.
This paper focus on static analysis. In the Kaggle Microsoft
Malware Contest [17], the winner used many sophisticated
features for their K-nearest Neighbor(KNN) model in order
to achieve high performance. Some other machine learning
techniques were also studied in different works. Rehman et
al.[24]reverse-engineered the Android Apps to extract manifest
files, and employed machine-learning algorithms to detect
malware efficiently. They observed that SVM in case of
binaries and KNN in case of manifest xml files are the most
suitable options for robustly detecting malware in Android
devices. Yuan et al. [25] proposed to associate features from
static analysis with features from dynamic analysis of Android
apps and characterize malware using deep-learning techniques.
Unlike all the above research, in order to cut down on
the necessity of expert analysis, MDEA will only use basic
features as input to a deep learning model. Many different deep
learning models have been proposed for malware detection.
Some people intend to solve this problem by Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) model [14], while others propose ”malware
image” that are generally constructed by treating each byte
of the binary as a gray-scale pixel value, and defining an
arbitrary “image width” that is used for all images [26]. From
all these approaches, the MalConv network[27], which use raw
byte embeddings as the input, achieved the highest accuracy.
Therefore, this model is used as our detection model.
Fig. 1. The overall flow of MDEA.Top: Detection Model based on the
MalConv network[27], Bottom: The Evolutionary Optimization Algorithm.
In this cycle, the evolutionary method learns modification patterns for each
malware to evade the detection network. The newly generated samples are
then fed into detection network to improve its performance. With this cycle,
MDEA not only prevents the adversarial attack against detection model, but
also increases the accuracy.
Fig. 2. The details of each layer in the detection model MalConv[27]. The
raw binary data is first converted to integers and then fed into an embedding
layer and two convolutional layers. Then the resulting vector is fed into a
fully connected layer for output.
C. Adversarial Model for Sample Generation
Nguyen et al. [28] inspired later research on adversarial
models. They found that it was easy to produce images that
were unrecognizable to humans, but deep neural networks
(DNNs) could recognize them with high confidence. They
trained DNN on ImageNet and MNIST datasets and produced
many human-unrecognizable images. Goodfellow et al.[29]
proposed the first generative adversarial nets (GANs). GANs
consist of two models. One of them is a generative model,
which captures the data distribution; the other is a discrimina-
tive model that estimates the probability that a sample came
from the training data rather than from the generative model.
GANs have a large potential since it can learn to mimic
any data distribution. Therefore, GANs have been used in
many domains such as computer vision and natural language
processing.
Recent work in adversarial machine learning has shown that
deep learning models for machine learning are susceptible
to gradient-based attacks. Anderson[18] proposed a more
Fig. 3. The evolutionary optimization cycle. The population initialization and
evolution phase generates candidate action sequences. The binary modification
phase modifies malware samples based on the action sequences. The popu-
lation evaluation phase selects the best individual out of a population. The
process then repeats for several generations until a good sequence is found.
general framework based on reinforcement learning (RL) for
attacking static portable executable (PE) anti-malware engines.
They showed in experiments that this adversarial learning
method can attack a gradient-boosted machine learning model
and evade components of publicly hosted antivirus engines.
Kolosnjaji et al.[15] proposed a gradient-based attack model
that is capable of evading a deep network by only changing
few specific bytes at the end of each malware sample, while
preserving its intrusive functionality. They were able to de-
crease the detection accuracy of the original detection model
by more than 50% . Even though this work achieved good
result, they did not use the generated attack samples to improve
the detection model.
This paper will reproduce and improve upon their methods
with evolutionary learning and leverage the generated adver-
sarial samples by retraining the deep learning model to further
improve the accuracy.
D. Evolutionary Algorithm
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) use mechanisms inspired
by biological evolution, such as mutation, recombination and
selection to select the best individual of a population to solve
an optimization problem. Initially, EAs were considered as a
scalable alternative to reinforcement learning[30]. In recent
years, EAs performed much better than traditional optimizing
method such as gradient descend in various domains [31],
[32]. This advantage of EA is becoming more important in
deep neural network because of the diversity and complexity
it provides[33], [34]. Martnı´ et al.[35] created an Android
malware detection system with evolutionary strategies to lever-
age third-party calls to bypass the effects of concealment
strategies. Petroski et al.[36] evolved the weights of a DNN
with genetic algorithm (GA) to perform well on hard deep RL
problems, including Atari and humanoid locomotion. Chen et
al.[37] built a model to generate groundwater spring potential
map. They utilized GA to perform a feature selection proce-
dure and data mining methods for optimizing set of variables
in groundwater spring assessments.
In all the above research, EA showed an advantage against
the traditional optimization methods such as stochastic gra-
dient descent and reinforcement learning. Such gradient-free
nature makes EA less vulnerable to local minimum and easier
to find general solutions in high-dimensional parameter search
problems.
EA is also highly robust and performs well when the number
of time steps in an episode is long, where actions have long-
lasting effects, and when no good value-function estimates are
available[30]. Therefore EA well suited as the optimization
method for MDEA.
III. MODEL
This section presents the design and process of the proposed
MDEA model. At first, an overview of the model structure, the
dataset information and the details of the detection model are
presented. The definition and details of action space, which is
used by evolutionary optimization method are discussed, and
the evolutionary optimization algorithm in described.
A. Structure Overview
Overall, the malware detection process consists of two
major parts (Figure 1). The first part involves preprocessing
malware sample data and feeding these data to 1-D Convolu-
tional network. The second part uses evolutionary optimization
to evolve adversarial malware samples to evade the network.
All the newly generated malware that successfully evade the
detection model will be added into the training set, and the
detection model is retrained. The first and the second part
together form a loop as shown in Figure 1. During the training
phase, this loop is iterated multiple times until the detection
accuracy of the detection model converges to an acceptable
level.
Since the development set is fitted multiple times during
the evolutionary phase, overfitting check is performed with
another small set that is never used during training.
B. Dataset and Detection Model
The dataset consists of 14,288 PE file, and 7371 of them
are malware samples, that were downloaded from VirusShare.
The rest 6917 PE files are benign files that were gathered by
crawling different websites. The deep neural network trained
and attacked in this paper is the MalConv Network proposed
by Raff et al.[27]. Figure 2 shows the detailed structure of
this Network. MalConv takes in up to k bytes data as input.
Each byte is represented by a number A = {0, . . . ,255}. The k
bytes that are extracted from input file are padded with zeros to
form a vector x (if there are more than k bytes in the file, just
the first k bytes without padding). Each element of vector x
is fed into a trainable embedding layer to get an embedded
vector z of eight elements. After this embedding process,
one-dimensional vector x becomes a matrix Z ⊆ Rdx8. This
matrix Z is then fed into two 1-d convolutional layers. These
two layers use Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) and sigmoidal
activation functions respectively. By combining these two
layers with gating, the vanishing gradient problem caused by
sigmoidal activation functions is avoided. The obtained values
are fed to a temporal max-pooling layer followed by a fully
connected layer with ReLU activation. The final classification
is made based on the output of the last fully connected layer.
If their output is greater than 0.5 then the sample is taken as
a benign file, otherwise it is classified as malware.
C. Action Space
The action space is based on the PE file layout.
A PE file consists of a number of headers and sections that
tell the dynamic linker how to map the file into memory. In
general, there are three types of layouts in PE: header, section
table and data. Header is a data structure that contains basic
information on the executables. Section table describes the
characteristics of each file section. The data layout contains
the actual data related to each section. Malware usually
modifies some of these structures to create malicious activities
that are hard to detect. The stealth and sensitivity of these
modifications make it harder to alter bytes without breaking
the malware functionality. However, some of the sections are
not important for the program to run. Some of them are
even neglected by OS such as the overlay section. Based
on such information the following action space is designed,
inspired by Anderson et al. [18]. There are 10 different
actions with trainable parameters. Each action accepts random
parameters to test evasion on a gradient-boosted decision-tree
model with reinforcement learning. However, this randomness
becomes a big issue in MDEA since the evolutionary algorithm
already introduces enough generality to the problem, and more
randomness would cause the model to not converge. Therefore,
a parameter set is used with each action to make the model
converge with acceptable time. The actions are:
• Add a function to the import address table that is never
used
• Manipulate existing section names
• Append bytes to extra space at the end of sections
• Create a new entry point
• Manipulate signature
• Manipulate debug info
• Pack the file
• Unpack the file
• Modify header checksum
• Append bytes to overlay section.
Note that some of these actions such as delete a signature are
not recoverable. Once the evolutionary optimization algorithm
chooses to perform this action, all later generations of this
malware will not be able to effectively perform the same
action again. This irreversibility causes the diversity to drop
drastically. This issue is addressed with more details in Section
4.
D. Dead Species
This section discusses the dead species problem. There are
many actions in the action space that are not reversible such
as removing signatures and modifying checksum sections. If
any of these actions are performed on the malware, a later
Fig. 4. The performance difference between a dead species and normal
species. The x-axis is the number of modified bytes. The y-axis is teh detection
accuracy. The big gap of the two lines shows how dead species can affect the
performance.
Fig. 5. Detection accuracy (in y) improves with number of generations (in
x), and eventually flattens out at about 10 generations.
generation will not be able to reverse it. Since it is unlikely
find an optimal action sequence at the beginning of evolution,
picking such irreversible actions drastically reduces the search
space. The offspring that contain those actions will be stuck
at a bad local optimum.
Figure 4 shows an example of such dead species. There
is an obvious gap between the normal species and the dead
species after 16,000 modified bytes. Investigation of these
two evolution showed that the dead species picked “delete-
checksum” and “remove signature” actions when number of
modified bytes was equal to 15,879. This result validates the
conjecture that irreversible actions causes the dead species
problem.
In order to solve this problem, validation weights can
be introduced into the evolutionary optimization algorithm.
These weights represent the probability of each action being
picked. The actions that can cause dead species are assigned
with a very low probability. This countermeasure worked
well in practice and increased the average accuracy by 1%.
However, the validation weights only delay the occurrence
of dead species, instead of actually solving the problem.
Fig. 6. Detection accuracy (in y) improves with number of modified bytes
(in x). The largest improvement is between 8000 bytes to 16,000 bytes, and
flattens at the both ends..
Any individuals that pick irreversible actions lead to dead
species and lose their diversity in evolution. Further possible
techniques for dealing with this problem will be discussed in
Section 5.
E. Evolutionary Optimization
A framework called DEAP (Distributed Evolutionary Algo-
rithms in Python) is used to construct evolutionary optimiza-
tion algorithm. It consists of three major parts: population ini-
tialization and evolution, binary modification, and population
evaluation (Figure 3).
The population individual evolution part breeds new chil-
dren using mutation and crossover. Mutation alters one or
more gene values in a chromosome. There are many different
types, such as shrink mutation[38], uniform mutation and
boundary mutation. The “mutShuffleIndexes” method were
chosen in DEAP, which shuffles the attributes of the input
individual. During the shuffle phase, there is also a probability
to replace some of the elements in those attributes with
randomly chosen elements. In contrast, crossover combines the
genetic information of two parents to generate new offspring.
It is one way to stochastically generate new solutions from
an existing population. The uniform crossover method was
chosen for MDEA, chooses each attribute from either parent
with equal probability. After the population is evolved, the
action sequence will be sent to the binary modification section
to produce modified malware. The modified malware will be
evaluated by the detection model and the statistics for evolving
next generation will be calculated. After the evaluation step,
the selection method picks the best offspring as the parent for
the next generation. For simplicity, the “selectBest” selection
algorithm was used in MDEA. This cycle continues until there
is enough data for further training, or the generation limit is
reached.
Let us denote a set of malware that the detection model
detects as M+, and the set of malware that it does not detect
as M−. The goal of evolution is to find a function f such that
f (m) ∈ M− for as many m ∈ M+ as possible. The function
is represented by an action sequence (a0, p0), (a1, p1), (a2,
Fig. 7. Detection accuracy as a function of random actions. The x-axis is
the number of bytes that is modified by random actions, the y-axis is the
detection accuracy
p2) . . . (an, pn) where ai, i ∈ [0..n], is an action from the
action space and pi is the corresponding parameter for that
action (e.g. for the appending overlay method, pi indicates how
many bytes to append at the end). Evolutionary optimization
aims to find f by crossover, mutation and selection of such
sequences. Let us denote the detection model as D. For any
malware sample m, if D(m) < 0.5, m ∈ M+. Thus, the goal
of evolutionary model is to maximize
∑
i D(f(mi)) where
mi ∈ M+. With these definitions, the overall algorithm for
the evolution is shown in the Algorithm 1.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section will discuss the experimental setup and results.
First, the details of the datasets, their division into training and
validation sets, and the hardware used to run this experiment
are described. The experimental results and their importance
are shown in terms of generations, modification sizes and
random actions.
A. Experimental Setup
To set up the experiment, 7371 malware samples were
collected from VirusShare, a malware sample data website,
and 6917 benign samples through web crawling. All these
14,288 samples are Windows Portable Executables (PE). The
dataset was divided into two sets with 9:1 ratio as training set
and validation set. A extra test set is also used to check the
overfitting problem. It consists of 100 malware samples that
are never used during training or evolutionary phase.
Both neural network training and evolutionary optimization
method were ran on Texas Advanced Computing Center
(TACC) Maverick2 server with 4 Nvidia 1080-TI GPUs and
16 Intel Xeon CPUs. The training time for detection network
was around 10 hours and the running time for evolutionary
optimization was around 24 hours each cycle. The accuracy
and the number of modified bytes after each cycle were
recorded.
Algorithm 1: Malware Sample Evolution
Result: Set R that contains a list of (m,A,P), where m is
a malware sample, A is an action sequence, and
P is a parameter set.
1 Parameterization:
1) Malware Train Set M
2) Malware m ∈ M
3) Pool of Candidates for
the next Population F
4) Evaluation Detection
Network D
5) Current Population of
(A,P,e) triples O
6) Evaluation score e
7) Population Size S
8) Candidate Pool Size L
9) Evaluation Score
Threshold E
10) Generation Limit G
11) Modified Malware r
12) Current Generation g
13) Modification Step i;
2 for m in M do
3 g = 0;
4 O = RandomPickAPpairs(S);
5 for (A,P,e) in O do
6 r = ModifyMalware(A,P,m);
7 e = D(r);
8 end
9 (A,P,e) = FindBestIndividual(O);
10 while e < E and g < G do
11 i = 0;
12 for i < L do
13 (A,P) = CrossOverGoodParents(O,(A,P));
14 (A,P) = MutateGoodParents((A,P));
15 r = ModifyMalware(A,P,m);
16 e = D(r);
17 F = append(F,(A,P,e));
18 i ++;
19 end
20 O = PickGoodIndividuals(F,S);
21 (A,P,e) = FindBestIndividual(O);
22 g ++;
23 end
24 R = append(R,(m,A,P);
25 end
26 Return R;
B. Experimental Result
The result graphs are shown in Figure 5 and 6.
Figure 5 shows the detection accuracy of the detection
model increases with the number of generations. After 10
generations of training, which is around 12 days, the accuracy
increased from 90% to around 93%. Note that there is a drop
at generation 4 in the graph, which is suspected that is caused
by the dead species issues discussed in Section 4.3.
Figure 6 shows the relation between the detection accuracy
and the number of modified bytes. There is a big jump
from 8000 bytes to 12,000 bytes. A possible reason is that
some of the sections in the PE file have specific length
requirements and when the number of modified bytes increases
above the thresholds, the modification bytes start to capture
more malware patterns, which increases the accuracy by a big
margin.
In order to show the accuracy is improved by evolutionary
optimization instead of the simple data enrichment,a follow up
experiment was conducted. Random actions were performed to
the malware instead of the evolution procedure. The resulting
samples were then added to the training set. The result
is shown in Figure 7. The graph shows that the detection
accuracy never rises above 0.912, compared to 0.93 in Figure
7. Therefore, the evolutionary optimization can help to learn
the malware patterns.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
This section explains the design choices for MDEA. It also
evaluates how well the current approach worked and what
could be improved in future work.
There are several design choices. The first one is the
detection model, i.e. the MalConv network[27]. Several mal-
ware detection methods were researched such as malware
images[39], N-gram, K nearest neighbor (Kaggle 2015), and
LSTM sequence model[14]. After testing with the dataset,
MalConv achieved the highest detection accuracy, therefore,
MalConv was chosen as the detection network.
Another design choice was to use evolutionary algorithm
(EA) as the optimization method to generate malware samples
instead of GANs or reinforcement learning (RL). EA has
several advantages. Existing GANs (GANs and its variants)
suffer from training problems such as instability and mode
collapse. EA can achieve a more stable training process.
GANs usually employ a pre-defined adversarial objective func-
tion alternating training a generator and a discriminator[40].
However, the action space cannot be simply expressed as a
single adversarial objective function. EA solves this problem
by evolving a population of different adversarial objective
functions (different action sequences). Compared to RL, EA
does not need to backpropagate the action weights and bi-
ases, which makes the code 2-3 times faster in practice. EA
is also highly parallelizable compared to RL since it only
requires individuals to communicate a few scalars between
each other. Finally, EA is also more robust in the perspective
of scaling[30]. It is very easy to extend the action space and
other parameters to achieve a different learning outcome. With
the above benefits, EA was chosen instead of GANs or RL.
The current setup of MDEA increases detection accuracy
from 90% to 93%. Even though the result is promising, there
are still some ways in which it can be improved. First, the
evolutionary optimization still suffers from the dead species
problem. The validation weights introduced in Section 4.3 only
delay the occurrence of dead species instead of solving it.
However, it may be possible to find an order of action sequence
so that it is not necessary to reverse irreversible actions. One
possible way to find such an order is to write order rules by
hand; another way is to learn them from the data itself. Even
if the rules are not perfect, they may help avoid dead species
in many cases.
Overfitting of evolutionary optimization is another field for
future study. The current solution is to use a unseen test set.
However, this solution requires more data gathering time and
can only be applied once. Recently, Feldman et al.[41] showed
the benefits that multiple classes have on the amount of over-
fitting caused by reusing development set. With their theory
and method, it is possible to extend the malware detection
problem to multi-class malware classification problem, and
the overfitting of development set can be reduced. The plan
is to relabel each malware samples into different malware
classes and convert the detection problem into a multi-class
classification problem to alleviate overfitting.
Another future plan is to expand the search space for
the evolutionary optimization algorithm by defining more
modification actions. The number of actions in the action
space is one of the key factors to ensure the diversity and
generality of the evolutionary optimization. However, because
of the fragility and sensitivity of binary EXE code, it is very
hard to create new modification action without changing the
functionality of the program
The size and generality of the dataset can also be improved
further. Since the search space is constrained by the diversity
of malware types, adding different kinds of malware into the
dataset can potentially improve the optimal detection accuracy.
The input size of the detection model can also be further
increased. Currently, MDEA takes in two million bytes as the
input. There are many malware samples in the dataset that
have more than two million bytes and the extra bytes are cut
off because of the length limit. The plan is to run MDEA with
larger GPU memories, so that more data can be taken into the
detection model, which may result in better performance. In
addition, it is necessary to run an analysis in the future on
how randomly modified malware can influence the detection
model. By conducting this validation, the significance of the
evolutionary optimization algorithm can be verified.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed MDEA, an evolutionary adversarial
malware detection model that combines neural networks with
evolutionary optimization. An action space is introduced,
which contains 10 different binary modification actions. The
evolutionary algorithm evolves different action sequences by
picking actions from the action space and then tests different
action sequences against the detection model. After success-
fully evolving action sequences that bypass the detection
model, all these action sequences are applied to corresponding
malware samples to form new training set for the detection
model. By training the network, detection accuracy increased
a significant margin even with limited computing power.
These results show that deep learning-based malware detec-
tion can defend against adversarial attacks and accuracy can
be further improved by evolutionary learning. Evolutionary
optimization provides generality and diversity that is difficult
to achieve by other optimization algorithms.
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